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This paper studies the provision of a public good between two agents under lack of commit-
ment and applies it to the problem of children￿ s consumption in separated couples, where
children are considered to be public goods. The custodial mother controls the child￿ s con-
sumption, whereas the father can contribute indirectly by making monetary transfers to the
mother, but has no control over how the mother spends them. Using minmax punishments,
I look for the Pareto frontier of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium payo⁄s, and characterize
the equilibrium and long term implications of the model. As in the previous literature,
agents￿consumptions and continuation values covary positively with their income levels. In
the case where the constraint for the public good provision binds, both agents￿private con-
sumptions increase relative to the public good provision. In the long run, if some ￿rst best
allocation is sustainable, the long-term equilibrium will converge to a ￿rst best allocation.
Otherwise, agents￿utilities oscillate over a ￿nite set of values. I then study the theoretical
implications of one-sided enforcement when the public good provider has the authority to
enforce transfers from the second agent. This is motivated by the wave of US policy reforms
to enforce child support payments from fathers. The model predicts an increase in the ratio
of the mother￿ s consumption to the child￿ s.
JEL Classi￿cation: C72, C73, D90, E21.
Keywords: insurance, lack of commitment, optimal dynamic contract, public good.1 Introduction
I develop a model of e¢ cient risk sharing between two agents in the presence of a public
good, where one agent controls the supply of the public good. First, I characterize the
Pareto frontier of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) payo⁄s of the game under double
sided lack of commitment. I then study the theoretical implications of one-sided enforcement
on the set of implementable SPE and more speci￿cally on the long run equilibrium of the
game, by asking what happens when the public good provider has the authority to enforce
transfers from the second agent.
The question of risk sharing in the absence of commitment has been widely studied
in the dynamic contracting literature. In a seminal paper, Kocherlakota (1996) studies
the problem of two risk averse agents with random endowments and a single consumption
good. Agents wish to insure each other against their endowment shocks, but are unable to
commit to future transfers: an agent with a high endowment one period might prefer to
consume that endowment enitrely instead of sharing it, and hence needs to be compensated
for staying in the contract through a higher stream of consumption than what his current
entitlement allows him. This paper builds on this benchmark model by introducing a public
good which only one agent can supply. The question of allocation of total income between
private and public consumptions is then added to the decision making process. At the
beginning of each period, the state of the world realizes. The transferring agent makes a
payment to the providing agent but has no control over how the transfer is spent. Given
the transfer, the providing agent decides on how to split her income between her private
consumption and the public good consumption.
Examples of such a situation are numerous. One application is to a benevolent lender
and a borrowing country, where the borrowing government can spend the debt in two ways.
The "corrupt way", which is to spend it on consumption and on buying individuals￿votes,
and the "ethical way", which is to invest it in capital and infrastructure. Assuming that
the lending institution has an interest in seeing the debt spent in the "ethical way", the
investment in capital and infrastructure is comparable to the public good spending above.
One could also adapt the present scenario to think of an economy with ￿rms and workers
who provide the human capital necessary for production. The public good in this case is
the human capital: the ￿rm needs it for production and the worker is the only agent who
can accumulate it. The ￿rm makes state-contingent transfers that are commensurate with
the worker￿ s capital, and the worker improves her capital through e⁄ort. Moreover, the
worker keeps her human capital when she repudiates, so her outside option depends on her
human capital accumulation.1
The application on which this paper focuses is taken from family economics, where the
literature has traditionally considered children as public goods in divorced and separated
couples. Typically, only the custodial mother can spend directly on the child while the
noncustodial father can make child support payments to the mother, who then allocates
1This is the type of environment studied by Marimon and Quadrini (2005). In their model, ￿rms face
competition from other ￿rms, and the degree of competition a⁄ects the innovator￿ s outside option and her
incentive to invest in her human capital.
1her post-transfer income between her private consumption and the child￿ s consumption.
The low economic status of children from divorce has been a major concern for legislators
and social scientists, who often cited the low child support payments from fathers as the
culprit. Weiss and Willis (1985) related this fact to the mother￿ s moral hazard problem: once
the father makes a transfer to the mother, he has no control over how she spends it. During
the 80￿ s and 90￿ s, a series of policy reforms was enacted by the state and federal governments,
including setting up guidelines and enforcement agencies to collect child support from fathers
in order to increase the welfare of children in single parent households. The problem with
this approach is that it overlooks important dynamics in the separated couples interaction,
since ￿xing the father￿ s problem through child support enforcement means tampering with
the mother￿ s incentives for committing to a high level of expenditure on the child. As
far as I know, this is the ￿rst paper to point out the danger of one-sided enforcement
in the child support case and to formalize this statement through a dynamic contracting
approach. In fact, the previous literature on child support has commonly depicted the
interaction between parents as a one shot game with a Stackelberg equilibrium outcome,
despite existing empirical work which suggests that parents behave strategically and adjust
their transfer and expenditure choices over time according to the past actions of their
partner.2 Going from a noncooperative equilibrium with no child support enforcement
to one with enforcement will necessarily increase children￿ s consumption (as long as child
support receipts increase as well). As will be shown, this is not necessarily true in a dynamic
model.
This paper relates to two other strands of literature. The ￿rst is on the voluntary pro-
vision of public goods, where most of the recent literature has focused on the free rider
problem in dynamic games of sequential contributions (Varian (1994), Marx and Matthews
(2000) among others). More relevantly though, this paper builds on the contracting lit-
erature by using the dynamic programming methods of Thomas and Worrall (1990) in
order to characterize the Pareto frontier of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) payo⁄s.
It also draws on Kocherlakota (1996) to model the e¢ cient allocation of consumption in
economies with double-sided lack of commitment. There are numerous papers that follow
these seminal works. One branch focuses on the asset pricing implications of these type
of contracts. Examples are Alvarez and Jermann (2000), `brahÆm and CÆrceles-Poveda
(2005). Another branch is on sovereign debt, such as Kehoe and Perri (2004), Kletzer and
Wright (2000). However, the literature has not considered the presence of public goods in
models of insurance in the absence of commitment.
The ￿rst novelty of this paper is to de￿ne and provide an incentive compatible mecha-
nism to implement the worst possible punishments in a setting with a public good. Coop-
eration is usually supported by the threat of reverting to the autarkic allocation where each
agent consumes his income forever. In the present context, the minmax strategies entail
no transfers, and in the case where the transferring agent is being minmaxed, zero public
2Del Boca and Flinn (1994), Argys and Peters (1998), Knox (1996) are a few examples of studies showing
that a dollar of income from child support has a larger e⁄ect on children￿ s consumption and educational
achievement than a dollar of income from any other source, a ￿nding which cannot be accounted for in a
static setting.
2good provision. If agents care about the public good, these strategies will not be incentive
compatible as the amounts that agents prefer to transfer and spend on the public good will
be positive. However, given a su¢ cient condition on parameters, the minmax values will
be implementable using stick-and-carrot type punishments.
As in the standard model of mutual insurance, when a transferring agent￿ s incentive
constraint binds, he must be compensated with higher current consumption and continu-
ation value, while the other agent su⁄ers lower consumption and continuation value. The
new case, which underlines the public good provision problem, occurs when the providing
agent prefers to take the transfer and spend it according to her own rule, rather than as
dictated by the ￿rst best. As a result, the provision of the public good becomes very costly
in terms of meeting her incentives, which leads to lower payments on the part of the trans-
ferring agent. So both agents￿private consumptions increase at the expense of the public
consumption. Moreover, one can rank ratios of individual consumption to public consump-
tion according to continuation values and states, with that ratio being highest when an
agent￿ s incentive constraint binds. This is because agents like to be compensated by having
their ratio of marginal utilities closer to their individual optimal than what the ￿rst best
entails.
The long run properties of the optimal contract are similar to the standard case. If there
exists a subgame perfect ￿rst best allocation, then any optimal allocation will converge to
a ￿rst best allocation. Otherwise, agents￿ values will oscillate over a ￿nite set that is
unique and independent of their starting values. This may happen only when there is some
aggregate uncertainty.
The last question this paper addresses is what happens when the public good provider
has the authority to enforce transfers from the second agent. What are the consequences
on the set of implementable SPE, and on the long run private and public consumptions
of the two agents? One-sided enforcement is often thought of as a solution to the free
riding problem in public goods and the purpose from this exercise is to study theoretically
the consequences of one the main reforms to the child support system in the US (namely
child support enforcement) on custodial mothers￿consumption decisions. The enforcement
equilibrium serves as the new threat point which supports the new Pareto frontier of payo⁄s.
Relative to the old, no-enforcement threat point, the enforcement option delivers a lower
utility for the father and a higher utility to the mother, making it harder to satisfy her
incentive for providing the child with a large consumption. As a result, in the new long run
equilibrium, the mother will spend on average a higher fraction of her income on herself
and a lower fraction on the child.3
The paper is organized as follows: The next section lays out the environment, followed by
a brief description of the ￿rst best allocation as a benchmark to the constrained problem.
Section 4 presents the recursive formulation, while sections 5, 6 and 7 characterize the
optimal contract and the long run equilibrium. The following section analyzes the e⁄ects
of one-sided enforcement. Section 9 concludes. Appendix A describes how to implement
the minmax values using stick-and-carrot type punishments. Appendix B contains proofs
3Hauser (2008) empirically tests this claim using consumer expenditure data and ￿nds strong supportive
evidence for it.
3of propositions, and appendix C the proofs and illustrative cases of the equilibrium under
one-sided enforcement.
2 The Environment
I study an in￿nite horizon repeated game between two agents: the father F and the mother
M, who each enjoy the consumption of a private good and a public good: the child￿ s
consumption. Time is discrete and agents discount future utility at rate ￿. The state
of the world in period ￿ is stochastic and is determined by the realization of a discrete
random variable ￿, independently and identically distributed over time, with support equal
to f1;:::;Sg. The probability that ￿ takes on the value s is denoted by ￿s, where ￿s > 0
for all s. Incomes at time ￿ are denoted by Y F
￿ and Y M
￿ for F and M respectively, and
are determined by the realization of ￿ in every period, with aggregate income denoted by
Y F
￿ + Y M
￿ = Y￿. The mother is the only one capable of spending directly on the child,
whereas the father is merely a contributor who can make monetary transfers, or child
support payments, to the mother. We assume for simplicity that incomes and preferences
are such that transfers are unilateral and positive in all states in the Stackelberg equilibrium
of the static game.4 All information is public, so parents observe each other￿ s income and
expenditure.5
Let f￿ and m￿ be the consumptions of F and M at time ￿, and let c￿ be the child￿ s.










where u(￿;￿) and z (￿;￿) are general homothetic functions (not necessarily of the same form),
strictly increasing in the levels of the private goods f and m respectively, and in the level of
the public good c. The expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of consumption
allocation ff￿+r;m￿+r;c￿+rg
1
r=0, conditional on the information available at time ￿. Finally,
the price both of a unit of private and public goods is normalized to one.
4This means that F￿ s income realizations are high enough relative to M￿ s, and that his altruism level for
the child is greater than some minimal level, which depends on M￿ s altruism level and the utility functional
forms. For the case with bilateral transfers, see Hauser and Uysal (2006)
5This assumes some degree of contact between the parents, and between the father and child. Argys and
Peters (2003) report that only 13% of fathers who settled personally their child support agreement had no
contact with their children. Moreover, if the mother is aware that the transfers she receives are mitigated
by the fact that the father cannot observe the expenditure on the child, she could provide evidence of
expenditure and income to him.
43 First Best Allocation
In order to better understand the incentive problems that parents face in this context, it
is useful to characterize the ￿rst best allocations where both can commit to a sequence
of state contingent consumptions. We can solve for these allocations by writing down the
planner￿ s problem where the agents￿incomes are pooled in one resource constraint. This is
equivalent to writing an optimization problem where F maximizes his lifetime utility subject
to a reservation utility for M: Letting ￿ be the relative Pareto weight on M￿ s utility, the








u(f￿+r;c￿+r) + ￿￿+rz (m￿+r;c￿+r)
￿
s.t. f￿+r + m￿+r + c￿+r = Y F
￿+r + Y M
￿+r for all r:
The ￿rst order conditions imply the following relation holds for all dates and states:
uf (f￿;c￿) = uc (f￿;c￿) + ￿￿zc (m￿;c￿)
| {z }





Consider a hypothetical case where each agent could decide on how much to allocate to the
public good out of the available budget, without taking into account the other agent￿ s action.
M￿ s decision would be given by zm (m￿;c￿) = zc (m￿;c￿) for all dates and states. Similarly,
F would set uf (f￿;c￿) = uc (f￿;c￿) for all dates and states. These are agents￿individual
optimality conditions, which in the ￿rst best are never satis￿ed, since the additional terms
on the right hand side of the ￿rst order conditions will never be equal to zero simultaneously.
This is a standard result in settings with public goods since the social planner internalizes
the e⁄ects of public good consumption decisions on both agents￿utilities. Note that as the
relative Pareto weight of M increases, the ￿rst best will prescribe a consumption which is
increasingly aligned with her individually optimal consumption, thus decreasing the wedge
between them, and vice versa for F.
This already gives an idea why, in a setting with a lack of commitment, agents may not
be able to achieve the ￿rst best allocation. Although the ￿rst best achieves the largest joint
surplus for the agents, it always dictates a provision of the public good that is too high,
relative to their ideal consumptions. Generally, when an agent￿ s Pareto weight is low, he or
she will be tempted to deviate from the ￿rst best and pick the consumption combination
which maximizes his or her period utility. The constrained optimal contract will ￿nd a
"middle ground" solution which will bring agents closest to the ￿rst best payo⁄s, while still
satisfying their incentive constraints.
4 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Under the assumption of no outside enforcement, the parents cannot commit to the behavior
prescribed by the ￿rst best equilibrium. We then look for self-enforceable contracts, meaning
5incentive compatible agreements from which agents will not want to deviate. At this point,
it is important to understand the incentives and disincentives of the parents from engaging
in a long term agreement, instead of playing non cooperatively. For F, the bene￿t from
making transfers to M is to increase the provision of the public good. The price he has
to pay in return is a "tax" on these transfers by M, who will privately consume a part of
them. Hence, any self-sustaining agreement should ensure that F gains enough from it to
still make the optimal transfers. On the other hand, the bene￿t of this arrangement to M
is that it increases her disposable income. In return, she has to distort her expenditure
choice in favor of of a higher amount of child consumption. This is true regardless of the
altruism levels and holds even if the mother cares more about the child than the father. So
a self-sustaining agreement should guarantee that once M receives F￿ s transfer, she would
spend it in the agreed way.
4.1 Strategies
The interaction between agents in our environment involves a two-part decision making
process in each period. At the beginning of period ￿, both agents observe the realization of
￿. F makes a nonnegative transfer: t￿ 2 [0;Y F
￿ ] and consumes his post-transfer income f￿ =
Y F
￿ ￿t￿: M decides how to split her post-transfer income between the child￿ s consumption,
c￿, and the private good, m￿ = Y M
￿ + t￿ ￿ c￿.
De￿ne an allocation ft￿;c￿g
1
￿=1 to be a vector of state-dependent transfers and public
good consumptions. A period ￿ history in this game consists of a sequence of realizations
for ￿;t and c:
h￿ = (￿1;t1;c1;￿2;t2;c2;::::;￿￿￿1;t￿￿1;c￿￿1;￿￿)
A strategy for F at ￿ is a mapping from possible histories at ￿ into a transfer. M￿ s
strategy is a mapping from possible histories and current transfer amounts into a public
good consumption. A subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) speci￿es:
1. A strategy for F such that his transfer after any history is optimal, given M￿ s transfer
and consumption strategies;
2. A consumption strategy for M given the observed history and current period transfer.
4.2 Minmax Punishments
The aim is to characterize the Pareto frontier of the set of SPE payo⁄s. A critical element
to the environment is the punishment each agent faces if he/she were to deviate from
the equilibrium path play. The worse the threat of the punishment, the larger the set of
implementable equilibria. Usually, equilibria on the Pareto frontier can be supported by
reverting to the autarkic allocation as punishment, where each agent consumes his or her
income every period. This is the worst SPE of the game without public goods, which also
achieves the agents￿minmax values.6 In this model, the worst possible punishments entail
6The autarkic equilibrium of the standard game without a public good is also the Nash equilibrium
of the static game. In the present model, this would correspond to the Stackelberg equilibrium, where
6no transfers between agents as in the game without a public good, but also no provision of
the public good when F is punished.
M￿ s minmax value is achieved by F making no transfer, and M spending her income to









￿ is M￿ s optimal child expenditure given that her income is Y M
￿ : F￿ s minmax entails







Because of the presence of the public good, minmaxing one￿ s opponent can be very costly.
Take M for example. Her payo⁄ from minmaxing F is





which is even lower than her minmax value W, so punishing F in that way is not incentive
compatible for her. So if the mother threatens not to give the child any consumption,
the father will not believe her. The same holds for F: Since he cares about the child￿ s
consumption, he would still like to transfer some of his income for M to spend on the child.
Hence, it is obvious that the minmax strategies are not subgame perfect. However, it is
possible to implement the minmax values using stick-and-carrot punishments which deliver
high values to the punisher. Appendix A illustrates in detail how to achieve that for very
general preferences, but I give here an intuitive description.
Imagine that F was being punished. The idea is to divide his punishment into two
phases: the "stick" phase of the punishment where his period utility is lower than his
minmax utility, and the "carrot" phase where his utility is higher than his minmax utility,
such that on average, his expected lifetime utility in the stick-and-carrot scheme is equal
to V . For any utility level, F￿ s indi⁄erence curve passes through di⁄erent combinations of
private and public goods. Those with low private and high public consumptions correspond
to higher levels of M￿ s utility. Pick such a point in the "stick" phase in order to minmize
M￿ s loss from the punishment. Whenever both agents abide by the "stick" strategy, they
are promised to move back to a speci￿ed point on the Pareto frontier (the "carrot") with
some probability. From there on, normal play resumes. On the other hand, if F refuses to
temporarily distort his consumption (so if he cheats on his punishment), the "stick" phase
continues for certain. Similarly, if M deviates from F￿ s punishment, she starts o⁄ her own
M takes F￿ s transfer as given and maximizes her period utility, and F transfers accordingly. Taking the
Stackelberg equilibrium to be the threat point in this game will have di⁄erent implications on the optimal
contract, generally reducing the set of feasible SPE payo⁄s, but also inducing some level of insurance o⁄ the
equilibrium path.
7punishment. The objective then is to ￿nd the "stick" phase allocation and the "carrot"
phase continuation values which will maximize M￿ s value from punishing F, subject to
the constraint that F￿ s value is V , and to participation constraints of both agents. An
analogous scheme is used for minmaxing M:
Proposition 1 An allocation ftj;cjg
1









































for all dates and states, where c￿







￿ + t￿ ￿ C;C
￿
:
Proof. In Appendix B
If F deviates, he immediately sets o⁄ his punishment, whereby M would spend nothing
on the child. Hence, F￿ s optimal deviation is to transfer zero. The right hand side of
the second inequality is M￿ s payo⁄ if she deviates by splitting her disposable income to
maximize her period utility, and continues with her minmax value. Consider an allocation
ftj;cjg
1
j=￿ satisfying the conditions of the proposition above, and let the agents follow a
strategy whereby they transfer and consume the amounts dictated by the allocation as long
as both have done so in the past, otherwise, they revert to the deviating agent￿ s punishment.
These strategies de￿ne a contract.
5 Recursive Formulation
De￿nition A subgame perfect allocation is e¢ cient if and only if there is no other subgame
perfect allocation that Pareto dominates it, and an optimal contract is one which implements
such an allocation.
Let V be the maximal payo⁄ F can obtain in a subgame perfect equilibrium, and W
be that attainable by M. De￿ne the function V : [W;W] ￿! [V ;V] to be the following:7























7This de￿nition assumes the convexity of the set of SPE. The maximization problem shows that the choice
variable ts enters the right hand side of M￿ s constraint positively, which makes it di¢ cult to guarantee the
convexity of the constraint set. If utility functions are homothetic of degree one, the deviation utility will
be linear in the transfer, hence guaranteeing cnvexity. If the Pareto frontier is not concave, there may be
gains from randomization. However, previous computations and results from Thomas and Worrall (1994)
and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1994) point to the strict concavity of the frontier.
8One can think of F as choosing the allocation ft￿;c￿g
1
￿=0 to maximize his utility,
while providing M with an ex-ante promised lifetime utility W; and satisfying the incentive
constraints for every possible history. The function V is the Pareto frontier of subgame
perfect equilibrium payo⁄s. As is standard in the literature, it is useful to solve the problem
above recursively. Following Thomas and Worrall (1990) and Kocherlakota (1996), the
frontier V can be characterized by the following recursive program:8
















s + ts ￿ cs;cs) + ￿Ws
￿
= W
and for all s :
z(Y M
s + ts ￿ cs;cs) + ￿Ws ￿ z(Y M




s ￿ ts;cs) + ￿V (Ws) ￿ u(Y F
s ;0) + ￿V
ts ￿ 0
Ws 2 [W;W]
The ￿rst constraint is a standard promise-keeping constraint. The second and third con-
straints are M￿ s and F￿ s incentive constraints which ensure that the contract is self-
enforceable. The non-negativity constraint on the transfers follows. Finally, the last
constraint puts bounds on M￿ s utility from the contract, where her maximum value is
determined endogenously.
The fact that M is the sole provider of the child￿ s consumption means that F￿ s transfer,
and subsequently the child expenditure level, are bounded above by M￿ s private consump-
tion and continuation value. For example, even if F had a very high income shock in one
state and wanted to split that surplus between his own and the child￿ s consumptions, he
would be restricted in doing so since any large transfer to M that is not matched by a
substantial private consumption or continuation utility for her, would lead her to deviate.
Figures (1) and (2), which represent the generic Pareto frontiers of payo⁄s from the
unconstrained and constrained problems, illustrate this fact. The origin depicts the minmax
values for both agents, values on the X-axis denote M￿ s lifetime utility, W, while those on
the Y-axis denote F￿ s lifetime utility, V (W). The existence of the public good gives rise
to the upward sloping parts of the utility possibility frontier since beyond a certain point,
decreasing one agent￿ s utility can only come at a cost to the other agent as well. The Pareto
frontier is restricted to the downward sloping part, delimited by the points A and B. In the
￿rst picture, the constrained and ￿rst best frontiers partially overlap, so for some values
of M, neither agent￿ s incentive constraint binds, and the ￿rst best allocation is sustainable
at these points. In the second picture, the constrained frontier lies entirely beneath the
8The Pareto frontier is self-generating, so continuation values will always be in the frontier. Agents
will not resort to ine¢ cient punishments on the equilibrium path, since higher continuation values always






















Figure 2: First Best and Constrained Pareto Frontiers 2
￿rst best frontier, meaning that none of the values combinations which are feasible under
the ￿rst best are so in the constrained problem. Finally, the two agents will only enter the
contract if their ex-ante values exceed their Stackelberg values, so the initial point must lie
somewhere between C and D.
6 Equilibrium
A standard result of two-sided lack of commitment models is that if one agent￿ s incentive
constraint binds in some particular state, she is compensated with higher consumption
and continuation value. In the presence of a public good, is it better to provide higher
consumption of the private good, or of the public good? Is there an optimal combination
of the two that should be o⁄ered? Below are some answers using the ￿rst order conditions




s the multipliers associated with incentive constraints for F and M, and
the nonnegativity constraint, for each state s, respectively. By homotheticity of M￿ s utility
function, we know that her deviation utility will always involve a ￿xed ratio of m to c, so
we can write z(Y M












); where 0 < ￿ < 1:
The ￿rst order and envelope conditions imply the following:9
uf(fs;cs)
uc(fs;cs)





























s refer to the deviation consumption levels of M in state s. For any given
promised value W to M, the states are divided into three sets: SW
0 where no incentive
constraint binds, SW
F where F￿ s incentive constraint binds, and SW
M where M￿ s incentive
constraint binds. What about the possibility of both agents￿constraints binding in the
same state? In the standard insurance model, the existence of a sustainable non-autarkic
allocation is enough to show that there are gains from contracting, which also implies
that both agents￿incentive constraints do not bind simultaneously. In this case, since the
minmax values are implemented using stick-and-carrot punishments which rely on values in
the Pareto frontier (as shown in Appendix B), a similar statement will be meaningless. The
correct assumption is: if there are initially no gains from cooperation, agents will be in the
Stackelberg equilibrium of the stage game, which is also an equilibrium of the repeated game.
However, if there exists an allocation which ex-ante dominates the Stackelberg allocation,
agents will reach an agreement whereby any deviation by an agent will lead to minmaxing
that agent.10
The following sections look at how each of the three sets of states evolves as M￿ s promised
value W varies.
9Notice that this characterization relies on the di⁄erentiability of the Pareto frontier. Koeppl (2003) ￿nds
su¢ cient conditions for the di⁄erentiability of the e¢ cient frontier in risk sharing problems with lack of
commitment. His proof is adapted to a Kocherlakota-type setting, but extends immediately to this model.
His conditions are as follows. Let S1 be the set of states where agent one￿ s incentive constraint binds, and
S2 be the set of states where agent two￿ s incentive constraint binds. If S1 t S2 6= S at W0, then V is
di⁄erentiable at W0: If there exists an incentive compatible ￿rst best allocation, then V is di⁄erentiable
everywhere. Another paper by Rincon-Zapatero and Santos (2007) shows that by changing the timing from
an ex-ante to an ex-post optimization problem, the value function in Kocherlakota￿ s model will always be
di⁄erentiable.
10In this model of sequential interaction where M￿ s deviation utility depends on F￿ s realized transfer,
one could imagine a contract which dictates in a certain state a large transfer from F to M (say when
F￿ s income is highest relative to M￿ s), and a high child expenditure to match that. A natural question is
whether both agents￿constraints could bind sequentially in the same period. The answer is no, since the
worst that the contract can do is the Stackelberg allocation in which constraints are slack. Starting from
that point, increase one agent￿ s utility until the other agent￿ s constraint binds.
116.1 States where no incentive constraint binds
For a given promised utility, if no incentive constraint binds in a set of the states, agents will
be able to achieve the ￿rst best allocation in these states in the contract. Attach the FB
subscript to the resulting consumption and transfer values. The ￿rst order conditions imply





s are each a constant fraction of the total income Ys:11
Moreover, as M￿ s relative Pareto weight ￿ increases, her private consumption increases both










, hence shrinking the
wedge between her individually optimal consumption and her actual consumption. The
reverse holds for F. The envelope condition implies that the continuation values of agents
are also constant for states in SW
0 .
6.2 States where F￿ s incentive constraint binds
When F￿ s incentive constraint binds, the outcome is similar to an increase in his relative
Pareto weight. The envelope condition implies that V 0(Ws) > V 0(W); so his continuation
value increases. His private consumption increases both in absolute terms, and relative to
the child￿ s, while the opposite holds for M. Looking back at F￿ s incentive constraint and
noting that for a given state s, the transfer ts is increasing in W, one can see that the lower
F￿ s value, the more di¢ cult he ￿nds it to comply with the contract allocation. And since
the right hand side of the inequality depends only on F￿ s income in a given state and not
on his current value, so will the compensation when his incentive constraint binds. The
period deviation utilities of F are state-dependent, but independent of his promised value,
and so will his consumption values and continuation utilities be. The following proposition
formalizes the claims made in the last two subsections:
Proposition 2 1. If s 2 SW
0 and S
~ W
0 where W < ~ W then ms < ~ ms and (ms=cs) <
(~ ms=~ cs); where ~ ms and ~ cs are consumption values at ~ W:
2. If s 2 SW
F ; then fs > fFB






and Ws < W:
3. If s 2 SW
F ; then s 2 S
~ W









his continuation value in state s, for ~ W:
Proof. In Appendix B
The sets SW
0 and SW
F can easily be compared to those in the model without public
good. The higher the relative income today, the more likely is the incentive constraint to
bind. Agents are compensated through higher private consumption, allocations that are
increasingly aligned with their taste for the public good, as well as through continuation
utilities that covary positively with income levels. The last part of this analysis studies
the set of states where M￿ s incentive constraint binds. This is maybe the most interesting
11In the case of no aggregate uncertainty where Ys = Y for all s, this would correspond to complete
insurance against income shocks.
12case, since it captures the moral hazard problem related to the provision of the public good
speci￿cally, as opposed to that related to the insurance aspect.
6.3 States where M￿ s incentive constraint binds
In this set of states, the ￿rst best allocation provides M with a lower period utility than
what she would get by spending the transfer as her individual optimality condition dictates.
F can compensate M in three ways: by increasing her continuation utility, increasing her
disposable income, or, for a given level of disposable income, by shifting her expenditure
from cs to ms. The envelope condition implies that M￿ s continuation utility is indeed higher.
Looking again at M￿ s incentive constraint, one sees that the transfer ts enters positively
on both sides of the inequality, so increasing M￿ s disposable income would exacerbate her
incentive problem by granting her a larger income with which to abscond. As opposed
to the case where F￿ s constraint binds, M￿ s problem is alleviated by allowing her a lower
fraction of income, but still letting her increase her private consumption relative to the
child￿ s, which necessarily falls. Hence, both agents￿ratios of private consumption to the
child￿ s consumption rise.12 Notice that this is also di⁄erent from the insurance case with
no public good, where one agent￿ s constraint binding always means a lower consumption
for the other agent. This is an important result as it clari￿es why the solution to the low
consumption of children from divorce may not necessarily reside in increasing the custodial
mothers￿incomes, or at least not doing so unconditionally.
Proposition 3 1. If s 2 SW














s and Ws > W:
2. If s 2 SW
M; then s 2 S
~ W
M for all ~ W < W: Moreover, ~ ms ￿ ms and ~ Ws ￿ Ws.
Proof. In Appendix B
In the standard model of risk-sharing as well as in this model, if the incentive constraint
of a transferring agent binds in all states, it must be that the agent is receiving the minmax
lifetime utility. Here, there may be a set of continuation utilities for which M￿ s incentive
constraint binds for all states. This is a direct implication of M￿ s deviation utility being a
function of the transfer since her disposable income in these states is Y M
s + ts.
7 Long Run Equilibrium
In the long run, agents may converge to two types of equilibria, depending on the surplus
from contracting: one where some ￿rst best allocation is ultimately implementable, and
one where their incentive constraints will always bind. What matters in determinimg the
long run is the agents￿continuation values, rather than their period consumptions. A quick
recapitulation is useful to better visualize the long run equilibrium:
12Comparing ms to m
FB
s analytically without further assumptions on functional forms is not possible,
but numerical computations show that for CES and square root utility functions, ms is higher than m
FB
s :
13If F￿ s incentive constraint binds for a given state at some value W, it will bind in that
state for all ~ W > W. Hence, there exists a threshold value WF
s for which F￿ s constraint
starts binding for a given income level Y F
s : Denote the lowest threshold, which corresponds
to some income realization Y F
j , by Wmax:13 When M￿ s incentive constraint binds for a given
state at some value W; it will bind for that state for all her lower values. Hence, there exists
a threshold value Wmin, above which her incentive constraint doesn￿ t bind in any state. It
is easy to show that Wmin < Wmax; so the two values delimit two regions and in a way
shape the long run equilibrium. We can now turn to the characterization of the long run
equilibrium of the model.
7.1 When Subgame Perfect First Best (SPFB) Allocations Exist
The properties of the long run equilibrium are similar to the case with no public good,
and depend on the existence of an ex-ante value W of M where the ￿rst best allocation is
implementable.
Proposition 4 If there exists an interval of the Pareto frontier where the ￿rst best is
implementable, the long term equilibrium pair of values belongs to this interval. If the
initial promised utility to M; W0 < Wmin; agents￿ values converge to (Wmin;V (Wmin)).
If the initial promised utility to M; W0 > Wmax, agents￿ values converge to the pair
(Wmax;V (Wmax)). If M starts with any promised utility W0 between Wmin and Wmax;
agents￿values stay at (W0;V (W0)):
Proof. In Appendix B
Proposition 4 implies that the starting point of agents￿values does matter in the Long
Run. If one imagines that the starting point was reached through some bargaining between
the parents, then the long run equilibrium will always re￿ ect their initial bargaining powers.
Since the ￿rst best is achievable here, the lack of commitment and the public good provision
problem are both irrelevant in the long run.
A natural question to ask is when does a SPFB allocation exist? Kocherlakota (1996)
shows that a necessary and su¢ cient condition is for the symmetric ￿rst best allocation to
be Subgame Perfect in the case of agents with identical preferences and income processes
and no public good. In this model with income and preference heterogeneity, a condition
as simple and concise does not apply. Evidently though, there exists a ￿ ￿ such that a ￿rst
best allocation is sustainable for all ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: So as agents become su¢ ciently patient, any
constrained allocation will converge to a ￿rst best allocation.
7.2 When no SPFB Allocation Exists
What happens when there is no value W where the ￿rst best allocation is implementable?
Whatever the agents￿values, there is at least one state for which some incentive constraint
binds, and a positive probability that continuation values will be di⁄erent from current
13V (Wmax) is also F￿ s continuation value when his incentive constraint binds for income Y
F
j at any value
W of M:
14values. The next proposition says that agents￿values will oscillate over a set of values, and
that the set is independent of the agents￿starting point.
Proposition 5 If there exists no SPFB allocation, the conditional distribution of M￿ s con-
tinuation value will converge to a nondegenerate distribution. Moreover, this distribution is
unique and does not depend on the initial value W0:
Proof. In Appendix B
Under this type of equilibrium, the set of agents￿ possible values will be the same,
regardless of their starting points, and the continuing ￿ uctuation in the consumption choices
will always re￿ ect the lack of commitment problem.
One would like to know what novelty the presence of the public good brings to the
analysis, and how it a⁄ects the long run behavior. The answer to that question depends
on the assumption of whether there is aggregate uncertainty (so total income is constant
in all states) or not. Given that in the absence of aggregate uncertainty the ￿rst best
allocations display perfect insurance, the right-hand side of M￿ s incentive constraint is
constant across states. Hence, if her constraint binds in one state, it will bind in all states,
and the consumption allocations and the continuation values will be equal across states (a
kind of suboptimal but perfect risk sharing). This also means that there exists a value
(Wmin) below which M￿ s constraint binds for all values and all states and above which it
never binds. In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, M￿ s incentive constraint will not bind
in the long run: once her value goes above Wmin, it will never go again below it. On the
other hand, F￿ s incentive constraint starts binding for high income levels ￿rst and high
values of W, then it binds for all states when he￿ s at his minmax value. Since both agents￿
incentive constraints cannot bind simultaneously in a state, there should exist a value where
a SPFB allocation is implementable. If on the other hand there is aggregate uncertainty,
for a given value W, M￿ s incentive constraint may bind in some states but not in others
and the ranges of values over which each agent￿ s constraint may bind can overlap, so both
types of equilibria are possible.
8 E¢ cient Equilibria Under Strict Enforcement:
Equipped with the characterization of the set of SPE from the previous sections, we are
set to ask policy questions and conduct relevant comparative statics. What if information
was worse, or incomes were more unequal, or preferences more similar? Would better
enforcement solve the lack of commitment problem? The next section addresses precisely
that last question by simulating a policy change which enforces transfers from F to M that
are equal to a ￿xed percentage of F￿ s income.
8.1 US Institutional Background
Federal endeavors to institute a national child support program started in 1975 with the
passage of title IV-D of the Social Security Act, which aimed at supporting states in es-
tablishing paternity and locating absent parents, as well as determining and enforcing child
15support obligations. Since then, total IV-D expenditure has grown steadily,14 and strict
laws governing child support awards and enforcement of payments have emerged.
Child Support Guidelines: Until the mid 80￿ s, child support awards were left to the
judge￿ s discretion and decided on a case by case basis. The Child Support Amendments of
1984 required all states to adopt guidelines by 1987, based on a numerical formulation. , in
the aim of standardizing and increasing child support awards. Guidelines are state speci￿c,
and are usually calculated as a function of the noncustodial parent￿ s income, the number of
children, and rarely, the custodial parent￿ s income. Many awards are simply set to be 15 to
20% of the noncustodial parent￿ s gross income at the time of separation, and adjust only
every few years.15
Child Support Enforcement: The second obstacle to tackle was the amount actually
paid by noncustodial fathers. Previously, mothers had to ￿le separately for enforcement
through court, a too costly and time consuming procedure. The Amendments of 1984
established wage withholding when payments were 1 month overdue, whereby the child
support amount is deducted from the father￿ s paycheck and transferred directly to the
mother. By 1996, all states had adopted an automatic wage withholding policy from the
time of the order.16
The bene￿ts from child support enforcement are clear in the sense of guaranteeing that
noncustodial parents contribute their share in the upbringing expenses of their children.
Many studies have looked at the e⁄ectiveness of these policies and have found that, despite
the majority of mothers relying on income withholding for their child support receipts, the
total amounts paid did not increase dramatically over the last twenty years.17 Moreover,
there are no studies, as far as we know, which have examined speci￿cally child welfare as a
result of those laws. A static analysis of the problem would necessarily imply that increased
child support payments will result in higher children consumption. The analysis below
shows that in a dynamic setting, the answer is ambiguous, since enforcement will generally
weaken the mother￿ s incentive to spend a high fraction of their income on the child.
8.2 New Outside Values
When we introduce one-sided enforcement into the picture, the outside options of the agents
are no longer equal to their old minmax values. In fact, letting tenf be the mandatory
14In 2006, $3.9 billion were available for child support enforcement alone.
15The Wisconsin standard dictates 17% of the father￿ s gross income for one child.
16Among other enforcement measures are income tax refund and unemployment bene￿ts interception,
suspension of professional licenses, freezing and seizing of accounts, passport denial.
17See Cancian and Meyer (2005) or Hauser (2008b) for more on that issue. The main reasons put forward
are the changing composition of single mothers (from less than 20% who were never married in 1976 to 45%
in 1997) and the di¢ culty of tracking down fathers who move to di⁄erent states and change jobs. Another
reason is that voluntary agreements in reality resulted in higher awards, payments and compliance rates
than court orders.














s + tenf ￿ c￿
s;c￿
s)
It is evident that W < Wenf since M is now guaranteed some minimal payments, as
opposed to none in her old punishment. On the other hand, V > Venf since F￿ s minmax
payo⁄is equivalent to what he would receive if he transferred some of his income to M, and
she spent nothing on the public good. Having the possibility of privately contracting, the
agents will resort to the enforcement option only if they fail to come to an agreement. Once
in a self-sustainable contract, agents will never turn to that option in equilibrium. Still, the
possibility of enforcement, by altering the outside values, will alter the whole equilibrium
play.
First, M￿ s individual rationality constraint means that a set of her lower lifetime utilities
(from W to Wenf) cannot be sustained anymore. Moreover, by raising her outside option,
her incentive constraint will start to bind in some states for some values where the ￿rst
best was achievable before. Finally, for states and values where her incentive constraint
was binding, the old allocation will not be incentive compatible any longer. The opposite is
true for F. A set of new lower lifetime utilities (from Venf to V ) which was not sustainable
before will become so. Lowering F￿ s outside option means that his incentive constraint will
stop binding for some states and values where it was binding.The overall expected e⁄ect is
a rise in the ratio of M￿ s private to public consumption.
An important point here is that the new set of SPE does not correspond exactly with
the old one. Indeed, there will be a shift in the Pareto frontier, making the comparison
between the old equilibrium and the new one rather tricky. As the next two subsections
show, the result will depend on the type of long run equilibrium which was in place before
the enforcement laws came in.
8.3 Case where SPFB Allocations Exist Before and After Enforcement
Figure (3) illustrates digrammatically the Pareto frontier before and after the introduction
of the enforcement policies.The dotted blue line depicts the old constrained frontier, while
the dashed red line depicts the new frontier. On the old frontier, for values of M smaller
than Wmin, her incentive constraint binds for some states, and for values greater than Wmax,
F￿ s binds for some states. On the new frontier, the values W0
min and W0
max delimit the new
interval of values where the ￿rst best is implementable. Letting WLR and W0
LR be the old
and new long run equilibrium values, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6 In the case where SPFB allocations exist before and after enforcement,
W0
min > Wmin;W0
max > Wmax and W0
LR ￿ WLR: In terms of consumption, (ms=cs)
0 ￿
(ms=cs) for all states, where (ms=cs)











Figure 3: Pareto Frontier Before and After Enforcement
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Figure 4: Pareto Frontier Before and After Enforcement
Proof. In Appendix C
8.4 Case where no SPFB Allocation Exists Before and After Enforcement
As in the previous case, the two frontiers will intersect at some value W￿, where for each
W < W￿, the old frontier is closer to the ￿rst best Pareto frontier and for any W > W￿ the
new frontier is closer. This re￿ ects on one hand the loss from a weaker threat to M and
on the other hand the bene￿t from a harsher punishment on F. Figure (4) illustrates this.
One key property to remember is the following ranking of the ratio m=c:
Individual optimality > When M￿ s constraint binds >
First Best > When F￿ s constraint binds
Out of the contract, the ratio m=c is the highest. Once in the contract, M will have an
incentive to spend a higher fraction of her disposable income on the public good. Moreover,
for a given value W, m=c will be greater in the states where M￿ s incentive constraint binds
18than in states where no constraint binds, and ￿nally it is lowest when F￿ s constraint binds.
This leads to the following result:
Proposition 7 The non-weighted average ratio (m=c)0 along the new constrained frontier
is strictly greater than the ratio (m=c) along the old frontier.
Proof. In Appendix C
Remember that under this type of equilibrium, agents￿values will oscillate over a set
of values which is independent of the starting point. In order compare the average (m=c)
between the old and the new equilibrium, one needs to know the probability distribution
over the di⁄erent states and values in the two equilibria. This is a di¢ cult task and I
don￿ t have a formal proof to the claim that (m=c) will indeed be strictly higher after the
enforcement laws, but in appendix C, I present illustrative examples with two and three
states, showing why the claim is true in those cases.
9 Conclusion
This paper extends the problem of e¢ cient risk sharing to include a public good. I consider
the special case where one agent controls the public good provision and the play in the
stage game is sequential. The public good provider may ￿nd it too costly to supply a high
level of public consumption even after she￿ s received a transfer, which would lead to the
underprovision of the good. I characterize the Pareto frontier of SPE payo⁄s using the
minmax payo⁄s as punishment threats and compare the equilibria under double-sided lack
of commitment and after introducing a transfer enforcement policy. A consequence of the
equilibrium with mandatory transfers is that the providing agent will spend a higher fraction
of her income on her private consumption and a lower fraction on the public good than in
the absence of enforcement. This is not surprising, given that the optimal contract speci￿ed
a set of contingent expenditure which usually di⁄ered from the allocation she would have
picked, were it not for the threat of punishment.
This exercise is motivated partly by the response of US lawmakers to the problem of
noncustodial fathers￿lack of compliance with child support orders. As a way of guaran-
teeing the welfare of children (which are considered to be public goods in the couple) from
divorced and separated parents, strict laws governing child support awards and enforcement
of payments have emerged which generally withhold a percentage of the father￿ s income and
give it automatically to the custodial mother. If indeed the fathers￿low compliance is due
to their lack of control over how mothers spend their income, the one-sided enforcement of
child support contracts may worsen the mothers￿moral hazard problem and lead to even
more suboptimal results. Hauser (2008) takes precisely the theoretical prediction from this
model and ￿nds strong empirical support for it. Using Consumer Expenditure Survey data,
it ￿nds that the ratio of mother to child consumption has increased for mothers who went
from not having access to the enforcement mechanism to having it, while that ratio did
not change for single mothers who did not receive child support, and hence, did not bene￿t
from the enforcement laws. Without further assumptions on the model primitives (such as
parents utility functions and altruism levels, their income processes, etc) it is impossible
19to conduct a welfare analysis of the policy in question. Still, this highlights the balance
obtained through the double threat in a situation with lack of commitment, and questions
the suitability of a one-sided ￿x with no accountability requirement on the second party.
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2210 Appendix A: Implementing the Minmax Payo⁄s
10.1 F￿ s Punishment:
M￿ s minmax requires F to make no transfer to M, and M to spend her income to maximize











s is M￿ s utility maximizing level of the public good, given her income Y M
s : F￿ s
minmax value is achieved by M not spending anything on the public good no matter what















As said before, this value is lower than M￿ s own minmax value, so minmaxing F in that way
is not incentive compatible for her. However one could implement F￿ s value in a di⁄erent
way, by distorting F￿ s consumption such that he still receives his minmax, while ensuring
M gets as high a utility as possible.For that, stick-and carrot punishments are used. The
objective is to deliver the expected value V to F in two phases: the stick phase, where
F￿ s per-period utility vs < (1 ￿ ￿)V ; and the carrot phase, where F￿ s per-period utility










and M gets a high enough payo⁄ so that she would want to participate in F￿ s punishment.











s ￿ ts;cs) + ￿(￿V (W) + (1 ￿ ￿)V ) = V
Let W be M￿ s value from F￿ s punishment. While in the stick phase, agents￿values lie below
the Pareto frontier of payo⁄s (and outside the set of SPE payo⁄s). Every period, there is a
probability ￿ of ending the stick phase and turning to the carrot phase of the punishment.
In that phase, agents return to the Pareto frontier and resume the contract: M￿ s value
jumps to W, while F￿ s is V (W):The punishment speci￿es state contingent transfers and
23consumption values, as well as a continuation value W, subject to the constraint that F￿ s
value from the punishment path is equal to his minmax value.18 This means that during
the stick phase, F￿ s utility is lower than his minmax utility: while the minmax allows
F to privately consume all his income, the stick phase of the punishment requires F to
transfer part of his income, with possibly a very small part of that transfer going toward
the provision of the public good, and the largest part being consumed by M.
In order for the punishment to be sustainable, the incentive constraint for M should
specify that in the case of F deviating by transferring any amount other than the pun-
ishment amount, M will prefer to stick to the punishment path, than to cheat on it by
spending according to her optimal rule, and continuing with her minmax value. Thus, the
retribution for cheating on the other agent￿ s punishment is by switching to the cheater￿ s
own punishment. This idea can be expressed in two ways. A simple (albeit restrictive) way,
is to say that M￿ s incentive constraint should hold for any transfer that F may make, that
is
for all s; z(Y M
s + Ts ￿ Cs;Cs) + ￿W ￿ z(Y M







s + Ts ￿ C;C)
and u(Y F
s ￿ Ts ￿ Cs) ￿ u(Y F
s ￿ ts ￿ cs)
In reality, this last constraint is more stringent than needed since all we need to make sure
of is that M￿ s IC holds for any transfer that F would credibly make, even if that should
lead her to deviate and revert to her punishment path.
10.2 M￿ s Punishment:
M￿ s minmax entails F not transferring any amount to her, and her spending her income
according to her own rule. Again here, minmaxing M may not be incentive compatible
for F. So I write a maximization problem for F in order to ensure he gets the maximum
utility while giving M her minmax value, so he would participate in the punishment. One
restriction is that the "stick" phase of the punishment cannot contain any transfers, since
M would then deviate and score a utility higher than her minmax value. So the only way in
which this stick-and-carrot punishment path di⁄ers from the minmax strategy is by having
M spend a higher amount on the public good than she would on her own (so giving her
momentarily a utility lower than her minmax utility), in return for a promise of a higher
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s + (1 ￿ ￿)W) = W
18Alternatively, one can specify W and pick ￿ optimally.
24The incentive constraint for M looks similar to her constraint in F￿ s punishment:
for all s; z(Y M
s + Ts ￿ Cs;Cs) + ￿W ￿ z(Y M
s + Ts ￿ C￿
s;C￿
s) + ￿W
where W is M￿ s value from F￿ s punishment, as calculated above.
To compute the values W and W0; one needs to solve ￿rst for the Pareto frontier,
assuming that W and V are implementable. Then, the consumption values in the stick and
carrot phases of F￿ s punishment can be calculated, followed by the consumption values in
M￿ s punishment. The Folk Theorem for normal games says that it is possible to achieve the
minmax values with appropriate punishments if agents are patient enough. The equivalent









minmax payo⁄s are implementable.
Two issues may be of concern here. One is: are these punishments hopelessly complex?
And second, are they renegotiation proof? For example, in the case of F￿ s punishment, if
the value pair (V ;W(V )) is Pareto dominated, both agents may bene￿t from renegotiating
the punishment and resetting their values to a pair on the Pareto frontier. In general,
renegotiation proofness will not be an issue if M￿ s value W(V ) is high enough, which
is aided by M￿ s utility in the stick phase being high, or the stick phase being relatively
short (which is equivalent to F￿ s utility being very low). I do not o⁄er a technical proof
of renegotitation proofness, but suggest examples of mechanisms which may answer both
concerns:
Take again F￿ s punishment. We know the following hold:
u(0;c￿
s) ￿ vs < u(Y F
s ;0) < vc
z(Y M
s ;0) < z(Y M
s + Y F
s ;c￿
s) and z(Y M
s ;0) < z(vs)
where c￿
s = argmaxz(Y M
s + Y F
s ;c) and z(vs) is M￿ s utility from the stick phase is state s.
One simple possibility is to pick vs = u(0;c￿
s); and in the carrot phase move to the corner






s) + ￿ (￿Vc + (1 ￿ ￿)V )
Vc being the lowest value F can get in the contract. This ensures M a payo⁄higher than any
payo⁄ on the frontier so the punishment is renegotiation proof. In general, this scheme will
work best when the complementarity between private consumption and public consumption
is high for both agents. For the case where the substitutability between private and public
consumption is high for both agents, the stick phase of the punishment will simply prescribe
a low level of both F￿ s private consumption and of the public good, along with a high
private consumption for M. The same applies when the public and private goods are highly
complementary for F and highly substitutable for M. The case which is potentially the
most problematic is when the public and private goods are highly substitutable for F and
highly complementary for M: In this instance, it will be very di¢ cult to grant M a high
utility while achieving a low value for F:
2511 Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions:
Proposition 1
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 2.1 of Kocherlakota (1996). The
main points to observe are that V and W are indeed the worst punishments and that the
deviation utilities on the right hand sides of the inequalities are the results of best responses.
Proposition 2
Proof. 1) and 2) In the case of homothetic preferences, the ratio of marginal utilities
depends only on the ratio of consumptions, and not on the individual levels of consumption.
















where h() and g() are increasing in their argument. The ￿rst order conditions in the






















































These two conditions mean that when ￿V 0(Ws) increases (so W decreases), fs increases
and ms decreases, which is the case when F￿ s incentive constraint binds, and part (2) of
the proposition follows.
In the case where no incentve constraint binds, V 0(Ws) = V 0(W); so applying the same
reasoning, part (1) of the proposition follows.
3) For the ￿rst part, note that for F￿ s incentive constraint to bind in state s, the




s ) + ￿V (W) < u(Y F
s ;0) + ￿V
The right hand side is independent of W; while the left hand side is decreasing in W by
concavity of the frontier. For the second part, since the deviation utility depends only on
current income and not on the current value, so should the e¢ cient compensation be.
26Proposition 3











: Then either increasing the transfer (ts ￿ tFB
s ) or drecreasing the ratio of private
to public consumption (ms=cs ￿ mFB
s =cFB
s ) will only make the di⁄erence between the right
and left hand sides of M￿ s incentive constraint larger. The remaining possibilities are:
(ts < tFB
s and ms=cs = mFB
s =cFB
s ), or (ts = tFB
s and ms=cs > mFB
s =cFB




s ). In the ￿rst case, we will have fs > fFB
s , ms < mFB
s and cs < cFB
s : In
the second case, fs = fFB
s ;ms > mFB
s and cs < cFB
s : The third case is basically a mix of the
two, with fs > fFB
s ;ms > mFB
s and cs < cFB
s : In the ￿rst case, M￿ s present period utility is
lower than her utility in the ￿rst best and lower than her utility in the second case. Having
both M￿ s IC and promise keeping constraint binding, F will choose the most economical
way to satisfy them. This will depend on the promised utility and on further speci￿cations
of the utility functions. For example, for the case of additively separable functions, (zc=uc)
is constant and equal to (zc=uc)FB; which implies that ms=cs > mFB
s =cFB
s and fs=cs ￿
fFB
s =cFB
s : Finally, Ws > W follows directly from the envelope condition.
2) The proof consists in showing that the di⁄erence for M between her ￿rst best utility
plus continuation value on one hand, and her deviation utility plus minmax value on the



























































in proposition 2, the ratio mFB
s =cFB
s is increasing in W; whereas m￿
s=c￿
























The proofs here are adapted from Kocherlakota (1996) and can be found in the online
appendix.
12 Appendix C: E¢ cient Equilibria Under Enforcement
Proposition 6
Proof. From F￿ s incentive constraint, it is clear that WF0
s ￿ WF
s for all s with equality
only if Venf = V ; where WF
s ;WF0
s are the threshold values for which F￿ s incentive con-
straint stops binding for state s: Hence W0
max ￿ Wmax: A symmetric argument holds for
M, so W0
min > Wmin: There are two cases: W0
min > Wmax and W0
min < Wmax: In the ￿rst
case, applying a similar argument as for proposition 4, for any long run equilibrium value




0 > (ms=cs) follows directly from part 1) of proposition 2.
27In the second case, if the long run equilibrium value of M was in the interval [W0
min;Wmax],
the new enforcement minmax values don￿ t a⁄ect the equilibrium, and (ms=cs)
0 = (ms=cs):
Otherwise, agents again converge to (W0
min;V (W0




Proof. The proof is straightforward. Divide the values W into four intervals: [W;Wenf);
[Wenf;W] and (W;W0]; where W0 is the new highest implementable value for M. The
old and new frontiers share the second interval only. For each W 2 [Wenf;W] and s, the
possible events are the following: No incentive constraint binded before and M￿ s constraint
binds now, F￿ s constraint binded and no constraint or M￿ s constraint binds now, or no
change occurred regarding binding constraints. In each of these events, (ms=cs)0 ￿ (ms=cs):
For each W 2 [W;Wenf) and state s, (ms=cs) on the old frontier is increasing with W and
is less than (ms=cs) at Wenf: Finally, for each W 2 (W;W0] and s, (ms=cs)0 on the new
frontier is increasing with W and is greater than (ms=cs)0 at W: Putting equal probability
on being at any value on the frontier, the claim in the proposition follows directly.
Case where no SPFB Allocation Exists Before and After Enforcement: Il-
lustrative Examples:
Example with two states:
In ￿gure 5 M￿ s values lie on the X-axis, while the Y-axis depicts the two states. The
solid blue line at the level of state 1 going from W up to WM means that M￿ s incentive
constraint binds in state 1 for al values in that interval. Similarly, the solid red line at the
level of state 2 going from WF up to W means that F￿ s incentive constraint binds in state
2 over those values. The fact that for every value there is at least some incentive constraint
that binds means that there exists no SPFB allocation. The set of values over which the
agents play in the long run is contained in the interval [WF;WM]: Any time state 2 occurs,
F￿ s constraint binds and the continuation value is WF: If state 1 occurs, M￿ s constraint
binds and her continuation value is somewhere in that interval. After the introduction of
perfect enforcement, the dashed lines represent the new values where agents￿constraints
bind. The new set of values over which the agents play in the long run is contained in the
interval [W0
F;W0
M]: Here, it is clear that no matter what the probability distribution over
the two states is, the average (m=c)0 > (m=c).
Example with three states:
Figures 6 and 7 depict two possible situations.
Figure 6 is di⁄erent from the two state example in the sense that the long run intervals of
values over which agents play [WF3;WM1] and [W0
F3;W0
M1] actually intersect (for simplicity,
I take a case where F￿ s constraint never binds in states 1 and 2). However, it illustrates
the fact that what matters is whether the switch of values happens over the same states.
For instance, suppose the number of steps it takes to go from WF3 to WM1 is two. So that
when M￿ s value is at WF3 and state 1 occurs, her continuation value is some W1
M1 and if
state 1 occurs again, M￿ s continuation value jumps to WM: Then the limiting probability
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Figure 5: Two States
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Figure 6: Three States (1)
Now suppose that it takes n steps to go from W0
F3 to W0
M1: Then the limiting distribution















It remains true that the average (m=c)0 > (m=c).
Figure 7 is more complicated since not only intervals of values intersect, but also the
states over which changes of values occur are di⁄erent (for simplicity, M￿ s constraint in this
case doesn￿ t bind in states 1 and 2). So on the new frontier, when state 2 occurs, instead of
staying the same, M￿ s value jumps to W0
F2: The problem comes from ￿nding out (m2=c2)
at W0
F2. As long as this ratio is not too high, it should not o⁄set the di⁄erence between
(m1=c1) on the interval [WF3;WM1] and (m3=c3) at WF3 on one hand, and (m1=c1) on the
interval [W0
F3;W0
M1] and (m3=c3) atW0
F3 on the other. In fact, since (m2=c2) at W0
F2 is less
than (m3=c3) at W0
F3; unless ￿2 is very high, we can safely assume that it does not.
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Figure 7: Three States (2)
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